The skill premium, technological change and appropriability. by Nahuis, R. & Smulders, J.A.
This is a postprint of:
The skill premium, technological change and appropriability
R. Nahuis & J.A. Smulders
Journal of Economic Growth, 2002, vol. 7, nr. 2, pp. 137-156
For citation:
Please use the reference above
Link to the postprint file:
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=14022
More information about this publication:
http://repository.uvt.nl/id/ir-uvt-nl:oai:wo.uvt.nl:89731The Skill Premium, Technological Change and Appropriability
RICHARD NAHUIS




Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
forthcoming in Journal of Economic Growth
Correspondence to:





This paper demonstrates that an increase in the relative supply of educated workers generates
a structural change in the production structure towards a knowledge-intensive production
process. This structural shift  may ultimately lead to an increase in the return to educated
labour despite the increase in their supply.  The paper argues that the steady increase in the
supply of educated workers that most Western economies have experienced in recent decades
may be viewed as the driving force behind the observed pattern of wage inequality. In
particular, the paper demonstrates that if firms can appropriate a sufficient share of the
intertemporal return from knowledge generating activities of their labour force, a gradual
increase in the supply of skilled workers would generate only a temporary reduction in the
skill premium followed by a permanent increase in the return to skill.
Keywords: wage inequality, growth, technological change, research productivity,
appropriability
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1. Introduction
The decline in wage inequality in the US as well as other European economies in the 1970s
has been followed by a monotonic rise since the early 1980s, despite a steady increase in the
relative supply of educated workers. In particular, as demonstrated in Table 1, wages of
non-production workers have risen relative to those of production workers. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that blue-collar production activities have been replaced by automated
processes that shifted demand towards white-collar workers in management and control,
skill-intensive service and maintenance, and science-based research and development.
1
*** insert Table 1 about here ***
This paper demonstrates that an increase in the relative supply of educated workers
generates a structural change towards a knowledge-intensive production process that may
ultimately lead to an increase in the return to educated labour despite the increase in their
supply.  The paper argues that the steady increase in the supply of educated workers that most
Western economies have experienced in recent decades may be viewed as the driving force
behind the observed pattern of wage inequality.
Our key assumption is that unskilled workers perform tasks (“production tasks”) that
are fundamentally different from those of skilled workers (“non-production tasks”). While
unskilled workers produce final goods and services directly for the market, skilled workers
produce services for internal use that indirectly affect market performance. They use their
skills to improve the firm’s production process and product quality, the firm’s organization,[2]
management, and marketing. Basically, non-production tasks entail investments in the
capabilities of the firm, or the firm’s knowledge stock, which ultimately determines its
productivity. This firm-specific knowledge stock determines not only productivity in final
goods production, but also the productivity of future non-production tasks. Skilled workers
build on the knowledge stock that has already been accumulated within the firm; not only
their skills, but also the firm’s knowledge stock is thus an input in the knowledge-
accumulation process. Thus, non-production workers both use and produce new firm-specific
knowledge, thereby creating their own complementary assets. 
An increase in the number of skilled workers affects skill premiums in two ways.
First, it raises the value of firm-specific knowledge. This is because of the non-rival nature of
knowledge: a larger number of non-production workers implies that the same knowledge
stock can be used more intensively as an input (complementary asset) in non-production
activities. Firms that are willing to pay more for knowledge are also willing to pay higher
wages for skilled workers that can develop the knowledge. Thus, skill premiums tend to
increase in response to a larger supply of skilled labour because firms start investing more in
knowledge, which is the non-rival complementary asset for skilled labour. This induced
investment effect must be balanced against the second effect: holding technology -- and the
organization of firms -- constant, an increase in the supply of skilled workers creates the usual
substitution effect and reduces skill premiums. On balance, skill premiums rise if the induced
investment effect is strong relative to the substitution effect, that is, if the return to investment
in knowledge that firms can appropriate is large enough.
Although skilled workers produce their own complementary assets, they might also
rely on knowledge created elsewhere. Firms internalize intertemporal knowledge spillovers[3]
within the company (taking into account that knowledge developed today becomes input for
tomorrow’s non-production workers), but they cannot appropriate intertemporal knowledge
spillovers to other firms. If a small fraction of the knowledge created by a firm’s skilled
workers accrues to other firms, then the appropriability of that firm’s investment activities is
said to be high (spillovers are low). High appropriability, in turn, boosts a firm’s investment
in knowledge and drives up the skill premium.
In the extended version of our model, the degree of appropriability is endogenous and
depends on the allocation of skilled workers over two types of knowledge investment. First,
firms can accumulate knowledge internally (in-house R&D); second, they can buy technology
in the patent market. Internally developed knowledge serves as a firm-specific input into non-
production work, and firms internalize these (intra-firm) intertemporal spillovers. Research
for the patent market builds on general knowledge, which generates intertemporal spillovers
that cannot be  appropriated. At low levels of the supply of skilled labour, patents are shown
to be the dominant source of technology acquisition, economy-wide appropriability is weak,
and skill premiums are mainly determined by the conventional substitution effect. However,
with a high supply of skilled labour, most research effort is endogenously allocated to firm-
specific knowledge accumulation, more intertemporal knowledge spillovers can be
appropriated, and the induced investment effect dominates the substitution effect. Hence,
when skilled labour gradually becomes more abundant, the share of patents in total R&D
output declines steadily, while the skill premium at first decreases, and then increases.
This paper is related to the literature that investigates how changes in technology and
the supply of human capital affect wage inequality. Two strands stand out in this literature.
The first strand focusses on the adjustment process to technology shocks, and finds that wage[4]
inequality may rise in the short run because skilled labour has a comparative advantage in
coping with a changing technological environment (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987;
Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997; Lloyd-Ellis, 1999).  In Caselli (1999), only the workers
with sufficiently low training costs can profitably acquire the skills necessary to gain access
to new technologies, while low-skilled workers keep using older low-productivity
technologies. The advent of a new technology therefore initially creates inequality. Since it
also triggers growth, which enhances the return to education, more low-skilled workers
acquire training over time, thus offsetting the initial rise in inequality.  Galor and Tsiddon
(1997) explain the cyclical pattern of wage inequality by the evolution of the return to ability.
Workers differ with respect to ability. The return to ability changes because of two types of
technological change. First, infrequently occurring major technological breakthroughs raise
the return to ability and increase wage inequality. Second, subsequent incremental
innovations gradually make technological advances more accessible for low ability workers,
which reverses inequality.  Galor and Moav (2000) explore how the advent of a new
technology makes part of the skills of workers obsolete. In particular, uneducated workers are
hit more severely than the educated, and within both groups, workers with lower ability are
hit more severely. Hence, inequality within and between groups increases. Inequality
increases only temporarily in response to a productivity shock, since it is the change in
productivity that erodes the human capital of low-skilled workers.
2  
Papers in this strand of literature have in common that an ongoing series of positive
productivity shocks (or a permanent rise in the growth rate) is needed to permanently raise
inequality. Also predicted is a positive correlation between skilled labour supply, inequality
and growth. With endogenous levels of education, increased skill premiums result in a higher[5]
supply of skills. Alternatively, if growth depends endogenously on the level of human capital,
then any shock that permanently increases human capital raises the growth rate, and hence
inequality. 
The second strand of analysis in the literature focusses on the long-run response of
wage inequality to increases in the supply of skilled labour. Technological change may reflect
a permanent shift in favour of skilled labour because of increasing returns (Acemoglu, 2000).
In Acemoglu’s (1998) R&D model, a greater number of skilled workers encourages firms to
create more skill-complementary technologies.
3  Only in a large market can fixed innovation
costs be recouped. In Acemoglu’s (1999) matching model of the labour market, firms open up
(better-paid) specialized jobs for skilled labour only if a sufficient number of such workers
are available. Only in a large market can the fixed costs of posting vacancies be recouped. In
both papers, increasing returns (due to the presence of fixed costs of vacancies and
innovation) are crucial in order to provide bigger investment incentives in larger markets (that
is, markets with more skilled labour). 
Both of the main driving forces behind inequality that are stressed in the literature --
comparative advantage to cope with technological change and increasing returns, respectively
-- play a role in our analysis. As is stressed in the second strand of literature, we study the
inequality effects of labour supply changes. More skilled labour implies a larger market for
knowledge inputs, which are produced subject to increasing returns due to complementarities
and the non-rival nature of knowledge. Hence, technology may shift in favour of skilled
labour. As is maintained in the first strand of literature, we find that inequality rises
permanently only if the growth rate is permanently higher. Skilled labour can take better
advantage of technological change than can unskilled labour because when technological[6]
improvements arrive rapidly, skilled workers have a large pool of new ideas to build on,
which makes them more productive. 
Our approach differs from the literature on wage inequality in three main respects.
First, we explicitly acknowledge the different nature of production work versus non-
production work. Second, we stress the firm-specific nature of innovation and other non-
production tasks. Investment incentives, and thus the reward to skilled labour, crucially
depend on the degree to which the value of innovations can be appropriated by firms. Third,
we focus on how firms change their organisation of innovative and other non-production
activities. This allows us to look beyond the labour market effects that have been the
traditional focus of the inequality literature. Our model provides a new testable prediction,
borne by the data, that the number of patents per R&D dollar decreases when the supply of
skilled labour increases. 
To connect wage inequality to innovation and growth, we use building blocks from
growth theory. We combine R&D growth models in which patents are assumed to take care
of rent appropriation (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991, and Romer, 1990), with a model of
firm-specific knowledge (cf. Peretto, 1998 and 1999, Smulders and Van de Klundert, 1995
and Thompson and Waldo, 1994). We use the well documented fact that spillovers are not
complete and instantaneous (Jaffe et al. 1993). We extend the theory of growth based on firm-
specific knowledge by broadening the concept of technological change to organisation
change.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the main model to study
the relationship between appropriability and the skill premium. In section 3 we endogenize
our appropriability measure by distinguishing between patentable and tacit firm-specific[7]
knowledge. In section 4 we confront stylized facts and model predictions. Section 5
concludes.
2. A general-equilibrium model of non-production jobs
2.1 Overview of the model
There is a continuum of firms, each supplying a unique product under monopolistic
competition. For notational convenience we normalize the mass of firms to unity. Firms hire
two types of labour, labelled skilled (H) and unskilled (L). The supply of both types of labour
is exogenously given and grows at a common rate l. Unskilled labour performs production
tasks. Skilled labour is engaged in non-production activities, which includes marketing,
organisation and management, financial planning, and research and development. Firms
maximize profits and consumers maximize utility. Consumers have Dixit-Stiglitz (1977)
preferences over a variety of goods. The model generates a balanced growth path with growth
driven by either innovation or population growth (in the endogenous and semi-endogenous
growth variant respectively).
2.2 Preferences and households' behaviour
The consumer side of the model follows the by now standard approach of growth theory. The





where t denotes time, g is the constant elasticity of substitution. Consumers maximize
intertemporal welfare that features a constant discount rate (h) and constant elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (1/D):
Maximization of (1)-(2) subject to the appropriate budget constraints implies that the price
elasticity of demand for any good xi equals g, and that the change of consumption over time is
governed by the Keynes-Ramsey rule (from now on we omit the time index t for notational
convenience):
where hats denote growth rates, r is the nominal interest rate, and pc is the price index for the
differentiated consumption good.
2.3 Production and non-production activities
Final output in each firm (x) is produced by production workers (unskilled labour L).
4  Their
productivity is determined by the stock of firm-specific knowledge (f):[9]
(5)
Skilled workers (H) gradually improve the firm’s organisation, production technology
or (perceived) product quality (through marketing). These non-production activities are
valuable for the firm because they represent investments in the firm’s productivity.
Accordingly, non-production workers accumulate firm-specific knowledge (f). The stylized
representation of the accumulation process is as follows:
,
.
The productivity of skilled workers in non-production activities (H) is determined by two
different types of knowledge inputs: own knowledge (f) and spillovers (S). These inputs are
aggregated in index K, the “knowledge base”. The importance of  knowledge inputs, and thus
of the intertemporal effects of research, is governed by N, which we label the intertemporal
spillover parameter. > is the research productivity parameter. The (non-production) work of
skilled workers is possibly subject to decreasing returns governed by 8.
5  
Non-production workers use knowledge inputs from two sources. First, they analyse,
exploit (and expand) the stock of accumulated firm-specific experience and organisational
knowledge capital ( ).
6  Second, skilled workers benefit from spillovers, that is knowledge
developed by other firms (S). This second type of knowledge inputs is beyond control of the
individual firm and is an intertemporal knowledge-spillover externality that is familiar from
R&D-based endogenous growth models. Firms do not internalise the intertemporal spillovers[10]
(6)
to other firms because they cannot appropriate the associated returns. However, firms do
internalize the intertemporal spillover effect from own knowledge generation to their own
non-production activities: they take into account that accumulation of specific knowledge not
only affects production but also provides inputs for future research. The degree to which
firms appropriate the fruits of their own research is crucial for the incentive to invest.
Therefore we need to be more precise:
By (the degree of) appropriability we mean the fraction of the total returns generated
by firm i’s research that accrues to firm i itself.
More formally, we define firm i’s appropriability (afi) as:
where   is the value of an increase in Ki. The numerator is the value of an increase in f that
accrues to the firm undertaking the research, whereas the denominator is the total return of
firm’s research: the return accruing to the firm doing research plus the spillover from that
research to other firms. Note that our definition of appropriability characterizes only the
returns of investment in terms of improved productivity of non-production workers. The
investment also improves productivity in final goods production, but since none of these
returns leak to other firms, appropriability is complete in this respect and we can ignore them
in our definition.
We extend the regularities related to spillovers and knowledge accumulation –[11]
familiar to the R&D-based endogenous growth literature – to all non-production activities,
which deserves some elaboration. To see the analogy between R&D and other non-production
work, think of a new way of organising a firm. The implementation and development of new
organisational schemes often takes years and builds on past experience. From the
organisational scheme that a specific firm works out some more general principles can be
useful for other firms too. If this information is written down or disseminates in some way,
other firms might benefit too (S). However, a next firm reorganising might use this
information but still needs to go through the process of convincing, motivating and adapting
to specific "own" circumstances 
7  (that is increasing the firm’s specific knowledge stock, fi).
Note that spillovers do not happen automatically or completely. Hence, we do not assume
perfect nor automatic knowledge spillovers, as is clear from the distinction between S and fi
in our specification and the fact that other firms’ knowledge enters (5) but not (4). Though we
argue the model to be applicable to the broad category of all non-production workers, the
remainder of the analysis is largely expressed in R&D terms. 
2.4 Firm behaviour
Firms maximize profits, discounted by interest rate r, subject to (4),(5) and the downward
sloping demand curve for its output. Suppressing firm index i, we may write the Hamiltonian
as:
, 




knowledge, that is, the firm’s internal accounting price for non-production workers' output.
First order conditions are:
Equations (7) and (8) represent labour demand. The firm hires unskilled labour up to the
point where the marginal cost of hiring (the wage for unskilled labour, wL) equals its marginal
revenue product. Similarly, the firm hires skilled labour up to the point where the marginal
cost of hiring (the wage for skilled labour, wH) equals its marginal product which is the
marginal amount of knowledge it generates   valued at the internal accounting price of
knowledge q. 
Equation (9) represents investment demand. The firm invests in firm-specific
knowledge up to the point where the marginal return to investment equals the cost of




The left-hand side (lhs) represents the opportunity cost of a marginal increase in firm-specific
knowledge: the return to investing an amount q (the cost of a unit of firm-specific knowledge)
in the capital market. The three terms on the right-hand side (rhs) denote the benefits from
investing in firm-specific knowledge: (1) labour-cost savings in final goods production, (2)
labour-cost savings in non-production work and (3) capital gains, i.e. savings in research
costs by doing research now rather than in the future.
2.5 General equilibrium
We assume that firms are symmetric, which allows us to drop all subsripts i. Goods-market
equilibrium implies  , and  . The capital market is in equilibrium if the rate of return
satisfies the Keynes-Ramsey rule (3), which can now be written as  . Combining
the Keynes-Ramsey rule with (9), (8) and (7) and using (4) to solve for  , we find:
where the rate of time preference is adjusted for population growth l: hl / h+[8+*(D!1)]l. 
The symmetry assumption implies that f and S grow at a common rate, denoted by g,
which can be written (from (5)) as:[14]
(12)
Finally we can solve for the degree of appropriability, defined in (6). First, we use the
fact that  , the value of a marginal increase in knowledge capital Ki, equals the marginal
product of Ki valued at the shadow price of firm-specific capital,  . Next, we
use equation (5) and the symmetry results qi = qj and S = f. Then (6) boils down to: 
afi = ". 
Hence, appropriability is measured by elasticity ", the share of own knowledge inputs in the
knowledge base, see (5).
2.6 Appropriability and the skill premium
We use equation (11) to identify four different channels by which an increase in the supply of
skilled labour, H, affects the skill premium wH/wL. This equation is basically a capital market
equilibrium condition stating that the firm’s rate of return to investment equals the rate of
return that household require on their savings. The capital market plays a decisive role in
determining wages of skilled workers, since the non-production activities they perform imply
investments (in knowledge capital). Whenever the return to investment increases, there will
be an induced demand for skilled labour and hence an upward pressure on their relative wage.
A change in H affects the rhs of (11) directly and indirectly, which reflects different
effects of an increase in skilled labour on the return to investment in firm-specific capital. For
the time being, we assume that the skill premium is constant (which we will show to be true[15]
in the steady state). This implies that the lhs of equation (11) is zero and that the skill
premium on the rhs should adjust to the increase in skilled labour. 
More skilled labour H directly increases the term in brackets in (11) and requires a fall
in the skill premium wH/wL.  This represents the conventional effect: if more non-production
workers are employed, their marginal product falls due to diminishing returns. In other
words, the returns to investment in knowledge falls so firms pay a lower wage to the marginal
non-production worker.
8 
Skilled labour supply affects the skill premium indirectly, since an increase in H
increases both   and  , see (12). Equation (11) helps us identify three indirect effects.  First,
the first (negative) term in (11) becomes larger. It is the share of the intertemporal returns to
research that firms can appropriate. Firm take into account that if more skilled labour is hired,
future research costs will decline more rapidly. The better they can appropriate these
intertemporal returns (that is, the larger appropriability ") the more they increase their
demand for non-production workers and thereby drive up their wages. Hence, more skilled
labour tends to drive up wages indirectly through an appropriability effect. Second, however,
more rapid declines in the cost of research make firms want to postpone investment and
thereby reduces their willingness to hire non-production workers, as long as these cost
reductions stem from spillovers form other firms. Hence, a spillovers effect exerts a
downward pressure on the skill premium (see the second term on the rhs). Third, there is a
cost of capital effect (see third term on the rhs). An increase in H increases the cost of
investment as it increases growth of consumption ( ), which makes households require a
larger rate of return on their savings, see (3). If the degree of intertemporal substitution (1/D)
is high this has only a moderate effect on the costs of investment. The higher investment cost[16]
induces firms to hire less skilled labour, which reduces the relative wage of non-production
workers.
To sort out which of the four effects dominates, we investigate the general equilibrium
dynamics implied by (11) and (12). Our main result is that an increase in the supply of skilled
labour may increase the skill premium. The simplest case to show this result is under the
assumption of constant returns with respect to knowledge accumulation in non-production
activities (N = 1); endogenous growth. As a result, the rate of growth in the economy depends
on the supply of skilled labour only; see (12). To avoid accelerating growth rates, we assume
that there is no population growth (l = 0). Note that both restrictions are common in
endogenous growth literature. 
The model is now fully represented by equation (11) and (12). Figure 1 depicts
equation (12) as the vertical line labelled GG. The SS-curve in the figure is the locus for
which the skill premium, wH /wL, is constant, as can be derived from equation (11). This curve
slopes upward as no-arbitrage requires that a high rate of growth – which makes it attractive
to invest in knowledge by hiring skilled workers – is met by high costs. Full employment of
skilled labour requires that the economy is always on the GG line. The skill premium jumps
immediately to its long-run value, given by the point of intersection between the GG line and
the SS curve.
*** insert Figure 1 about here ***
An increase in the supply of skilled labour may raise wage inequality in general
equilibrium, since, if H increases, the SS-locus shifts down and the GG-line shifts to the right.[17]
(13)
(14)
To find the conditions for a rising skill premium, we derive the closed-form solution for the
skill premium. Substituting (12) into (11), and taking into account that N = 1 and that the
skill premium is constant, we find:
Differentiation with respect to H reveals that the condition for a rise in the skill premium is
given by (use (12)):
This last condition neatly reveals the determinants that may cause the demand curve for skills
to slope upward. 
First, appropriability of the (intertemporal) returns to non-production activities (as
measured by ") should be high. This underlines our key assumption that skilled workers
create the knowledge that is subsequently used as an essential input in non-production
activities. If new knowledge only affects the firm's production activities and all knowledge
inputs in non-production activities come from outside (i.e. " = 0), condition (14) is never
satisfied and the demand curve for skills slopes conventionally downward. Note that most of
the endogenous growth literature considers this case by assuming that all intertemporal
spillovers from research are external effects for the individual firm. Intertemporal spillovers
imply knowledge creation of which the returns cannot be appropriated by the inventor. They
give rise to the only externality in our model. The larger ", the smaller is the externality and
the more likely is it that the skill premium rises with an increased supply of skilled labour.[18]
Second, the cost of capital should not rise too fast with increased investment, that is, D
should be small (note from the Keynes-Ramsey rule (3) that D governs the sensitivity of
interest rates with respect to growth and investment). This emphasises that non-production
labour is engaged in the investment process, rather than the production process. If firms hire
more skilled labour, investment and growth rises in the economy, forcing households to save
more.
9  This induces them to require a higher rate of return on their savings, especially when
they prefer a smooth consumption pattern (D large). When firms face a higher cost of capital,
investments in firm-specific knowledge by hiring more skilled labour, becomes less
attractive. The rise in the cost of capital thus mitigates the demand for skilled labour and
partially offsets the rise in the skill premium.
Third, diminishing returns in non-production activities should be small. Diminishing
returns with respect to the input (H) and output (f) of skilled labour (as measured by 1!8 and
1!$, respecitively) reduce the skill premium. 
To summarize our main result:
A rise of the skill premium as a response to a higher supply of skilled labour requires
that the appropiability of the intertemporal returns from an expansion of non-
production activities is high. Hence the return should accrue mainly to the firm rather
than to shareholders (in the form of higher rates of return) or other firms (because of
spillovers). Moreover, the returns should not fall too quickly because of diminishing
returns in non-production activities. 
Condition (14) is derived for the case of endogenous growth (N = 1 and l = 0). For the
more general case with N < 1 and  l > 0, we find that the skill premium rises in the short run[19]
under a condition basically identical to (14): "N > $D + (1!$) + (1!8)hl/g.
10  In this case of
“semi-endogenous growth” (Jones 1995), the short-run growth rate changes as in an
endogenous growth model, but the long-run growth rate is exogenous because the
productivity of investment falls as more knowledge per worker is accumulated. The long-run
effect on the skill premium vanishes together with the long-run growth effect. This again
reveals that the upward pressure on the skill premium is crucially linked to increased
investment opportunities, which make hiring skilled workers that produce investment goods
(knowledge) more attractive.  
3. Endogenous appropriability and patents
The model discussed above can explain the upsurge in inequality in the 1980s from a
sufficiently high degree of appropriability of intertemporal returns. We can explain both the
decrease and the increase in inequality in the 1970s and 1980s respectively by increasing the
appropriability parameter in the middle of the period, such that the inequality in (14) is
reversed. This section shows that appropriability changes endogenously once we not only
consider innovation based on inhouse R&D but also innovation based on external research
and patents. We show that an increase in skilled labour supply causes a reallocation of skilled
labour from external research to firm-specific R&D. Since intertemporal knowledge
spillovers can be appropriated in the latter research type, but not in the former one, economy-
wide appropriability improves.[20]
3.1 A model with two types of research
From now on we distinguish two knowledge stocks: firm-specific knowledge (f, as above)
and non-firm-specific (n). The latter is knowledge that can be directly applied in all firms,
that can be codified and sold in a patent market. The former is largely uncodified or tacit,
embedded in the organisation and monopolised by secrecy and specificity. 
Spillovers and appropriability differ between the two types of knowledge. Firm-
specific R&D creates knowledge with strong complementarities to the firm’s own activities.
It can be easily kept secret and exclusively exploited by the firm itself since it is intimately
linked to its own idiosyncrasies. As a result, appropriability of returns is relatively high. In
contrast, when taking out or acquiring patents, knowledge of a wider applicability is involved.
Patents ensure that the inventor gets a reward from any firm that applies this knowledge in
production activities. However, the patent system cannot prevent, and in fact stimulates, the
disclosure of information about general principles and ideas behind the invention that can be
used in non-production activities. 
The importance of our distinction between firm-specific and patentable knowledge is
supported by evidence in Cohen et al (2000) and in Keely and Quah’s (1998) review of the
empirical literature on R&D, technology and growth. The latter show that output of
knowledge production is inaccurately proxied by patents, as “[m]ost knowledge accumulation
does not occur from private firms’ R&D producing patentable knowledge.”
11  Cohen et al.
(2000) point out that secrecy and complementarities between the firm’s existing activities and
new activities are more important to secure the returns to innovation than patents.
Nevertheless patents are indispensable as a complementary appropriability mechanism and as




To introduce this second type of knowledge we extend and modify the production and
R&D functions of the model of section 2. Final goods production now benefits from own
knowledge (f) as well as knowledge acquired by buying patents (n), so that (4) is replaced by:
Non-production workers who develop firm-specific knowledge now build on existing ideas
accumulated in both knowledge stocks. That is, spillovers S in (5) are specified as:
, (5')
where   is the economy-wide stock of firm-specific knowledge and   is the total
number of patents in the economy; the firm takes both variables as given.
For the production of patentable knowledge we introduce a second type of firms,
labeled “patent firms”. They enter the market freely, hire skilled workers (Hn) and sell new
patents ( ) to production firms. The productivity of research firms is increasing in the two
aggregate knowledge stocks,   and  , which firms take as given. Accordingly, a patent firm’s
production function is specified as:
Equilibrium in the market for skilled labour requires that demand for skilled labour by




Free entry of patent firms implies that the price of a patent, pn, equals the production cost:
The demand for patents follows from the no-arbitrage condition analogous to equation (9):
12 
As in almost all R&D-based growth models (Romer, 1990, Grossman and Helpman, 1991,
Aghion and Howitt, 1998), in our patent sector, researchers build on the total stock of public
knowledge, but cannot internalize the contribution they make to this stock. Comparing
equation (19) with (9) reveals this crucial difference between the two types of research: the
private return to firm-specific research includes a term valuing the contribution of current
research to future research productivity ( ), while the private return to developing
patents does not include such an intertemporal return. 
As before, we relate this to appropriability. In firm-specific research intertemporal
spillovers can be (partly) appropriated, but not in research in patent firms. Applying an
analogous definition as in section 2, we find that appropriability for patent firms is zero and
that appropriability for the firms producing final output and firm-specific knowledge is still
increasing in ". We calculate an aggregate index of appropriability conditions in the economy





The remainder of this section discusses symmetric steady-state equilibria with
endogenous growth. Endogenous growth requires:  and l = 0. To simplify expressions
we set   and define  , which represents the weight of patentable
knowledge in the production firm’s knowledge base K.
3.2 Appropriability and the skill premium
We solve the model in terms of the ratio of the stock of firm-specific knowledge to the
number of patents  . Using (17), we can rewrite (5) and (16) as   and
. It follows immediately that on a balanced growth path with H constant,
n and f grow at a common rate, denoted by g, and A is constant. Solving for H and g gives:
and
The ratio of firm-specific knowledge to patents  is tightly connected to appropriability:
combining (20) and (21) reveals that a is monotonically increasing in A with  . In the
remainder we will use A as an indicator of the degree of appropriability. [24]
(23)
(24)
Equation (22) is depicted in the upper panel of Figure 2 as the BG-curve. It represents
feasible balanced growth (BG) rates. It is hump-shaped, reaching its maximum at
. Its shape reflects declining productivity of research (of external or inhouse
R&D) if the composition of knowledge is skewed towards one of the types of knowledge
(patents or firm-specific knowledge respectively).
In equilibrium the return to patent development equals the cost of capital. We find this
no-arbitrage condition by substituting (4'), (7), and (18) into (19). Along a balanced growth
path (where wH/wL and A are constant) this boils down to:
A similar no-arbitrage equation holds for investment in firm-specific knowledge, see (11): 
The expressions for the two rate of return at the right-hand sides of (23) and (24) are similar,
but for the term that indicates the dynamic externality that is appropriated in inhouse R&D
only (the strength of this mechanism is governed by "). 
Combining the capital-market equations (23) and (24), the Ramsey rule, (3), and
 from (4'), we may solve for a relationship either in terms of between growth and




The upper-panel of Figure 2 depicts equation (25) as the ARB-curve. Its upward slope implies
that a higher growth rate is to be met with greater scarceness of patents to prevent arbitrage
opportunities. High growth implies high returns to firm-specific research (see equation (24)).
To equalise returns, A has to increase, as can be seen from equation (23).
The lower panel of Figure 2 depicts equation (26) as the U-shaped SS curve. The skill
premium is unambiguously negatively related to appropriability A if " < D. However, we
from now on focus on the case where " > D. Then, the skill premium depends negatively on
A at low levels of A and positively at high levels of A.
*** insert Figure 2 about here ***
We now show that an increase in the supply of skilled labour moves the equilibrium
along the SS curve in Figure 2, and replicates the empirically observed time pattern of the
skill premium in the 1970s-1980s. An increase in the supply of skilled labour shifts up the
BG-curve to BG'. The intersection of the curves BG' and ARB determines the new
equilibrium in which the degree of appropriability of the research-capital stock is higher. In
the lower panel, the skill premium decreases. Shifting the BG'-curve up by further increasing[26]
the supply of skill, we see that the degree of appropriability increases further, but now the
skill premium increases. Hence:
An increase in the supply of skilled labour increases the degree of appropriability in
the economy and causes the skill premium to fall (rise) when appropriability is low
(high), 
   and       iff     . 
Starting from a small skilled labour force, appropriability is low and a sequence of
increases in skilled labour produces a non-monotonic development in the skill
premium.
4. Discussion: confronting model and empirics
The model is consistent with some main stylized facts from the wage-inequality debate. In
particular, the model replicates the following. The non-production employment share
increased in both the 1970s as the 1980s whereas the non-production/production wage ratio
fell in the 1970s and increased in the 1980s. This non-monotonic change in inequality
coincided with a monotonic increase in the supply of educated workers. 
The mechanism driving our model results is also supported by empirical findings. The
model stresses appropriability conditions and connects the non-monotonic pattern of the skill
premium to a monotonic rise in the ratio of firm-specific knowledge to patentable knowledge.[27]
Cohen et al (2000) find that such a rise indeed occurred in the US. They document the
increasing importance of secrecy and complementary firm-specific activities in protecting the
returns to innovation, relative to the importance of patents.
The distinction between patents and firm-specific knowledge allows us to look
beyond the labour market implications and check whether other implications of the model
match stylized facts. In particular, we connect the model to the fall in productivity of R&D
that is documented in terms of patent output per real dollar of R&D (cf. Table 1). The fall is
found for both the 1970s and the 1980s, that is, a monotonic fall that contrasts with the U-
shaped pattern for the skill premium in the same period.
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In our extended model, an increase in skilled labour supply not only generates the
observed pattern for the skill premium, but also a shift in the composition of research activity
towards firm-specific research. Typically, firm-specific research generates less visible
research output: secrecy and tacitness of the knowledge generated in this way make that the
propensity to patent is typically lower and innovation is underestimated in the innovation
statistics. As a result, research output statistics tend to report a fall in output when research
shifts to firm-specific research because these statistics concentrate on patents. On the research
input side, however, it is difficult to separate out the inputs in firm-specific research from
those aimed at developing patents. Hence, typically, measured patent output falls, but
measured input is not corrected for the reduction in inputs directed at patent development. 
In the model, what comes closest to the statistic that is used in the empirical literature
on research productivity is the number of new patents divided by the total real cost of R&D,
ignoring the distinction between inputs into firm-specific research and those into other
research. Using (17) and (21), we may write this ratio as: [28]
(27)
If inputs were measured correctly, the productivity statistic would be 0 npn/HnwH, which would
 be constant and equal to unity due to our assumption of zero profits in the research
sector, see (16) and (18). However, the ratio above has total inputs H
s instead of Hn in the
denominator, and because of zero profits the ratio boils down to Hn/H
s, which is inversely
related to the appropriability measure A in the steady state. As shown above, when H
s
increases, A increases monotonically. Hence measured patent productivity falls monotonically
and thus the model is consistent with the observed fall in patent productivity from the 1970s
to the late 1980s.
Not all stylized facts stressed by others in the context of the wage inequality of the
1970s and 1980s are fully captured by our model. While the skill premium was falling in the
earlier period (1970s) residual wage inequality increased throughout the period. Our model
does not account for this. However, Galor and Moav (2000) develop a mechanism where
high-ability skilled workers benefit from an acceleration in technological progress so that
inequality within groups rises. We could incorporate this key insight in our model by
allowing ability to differ within groups and by allowing the return to ability to rise with
technological progress for both production and non-production workers. Our model would
then replicate the observed increase in within-group inequality in both the 1970s and 1980s. 
The model presented above suggests an increase in technological progress throughout
the period we consider. In our simple setup this implies an increase in productivity growth
that is at odds with the much-debated productivity slowdown in the early 1970s. Our model[29]
lacks the costs of adjustment to major shifts in the structure of production that in other
models reconciles an acceleration in technological progress with a productivity slowdown
(e.g. Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1997). In our model, the transition to a knowledge-intensive
economy smoothly follows when firms employ more researchers. We could introduce
adjustment costs that imply a drop in short-run output. A faster pace of technological change
might cause erosion of the efficiency of unskilled workers (e.g. Galor and Moav, 2000) or
might require retraining of workers and changes in the organisation of the firm. These
adjustments take time so that the fruits of technological change can not be immediately
absorbed.
Finally, our model stresses changes in relative wages. It does not shed light on the
empirical finding that wages of unskilled labour have been falling for a long time. Modelling
a fall in real wages of unskilled labour requires us to introduce skilled labour in final goods
production. The increase in the supply of skilled labour could induce a shift of skilled
workers from production to non-production work causing wages of unskilled workers to fall.
This would give us an additional desirable result but would also substantially complicate the
analysis.
5. Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that an increase in the relative supply of educated workers generates
a structural change towards a knowledge-intensive production process that may ultimately
lead to an increase in the return to educated labour despite the increase in their supply. The[30]
paper argues that skilled workers produce knowledge that affects the firm's productivity
directly by reducing current production costs, as well as indirectly by reducing the cost of
future R&D. Hence, an increase in the supply of skilled workers would raise the wages of
skilled workers provided that (1) the degree of appropriability of investment in knowledge
capital is sufficiently large, (2) the investment costs do not rise too quickly, and (3)
diminishing returns related to knowledge accumulation do not set in too strongly.
In order to focus on the novel connection between appropriability and wage
inequality, we have abstracted from several important aspects of the phenomenon. First, as
explained above, we did not consider within-group inequality. Second, we did not examine
endogenous responses of labour supply to changes in equality. The literature has already
developed useful insights into these aspects (see Galor and Moav (2000) and Acemoglu
(1998, section 4), respectively). These insights can be easily applied to our model. Finally, the
distinction between major innovation and incremental technological change can be
incorporated into the analysis. Such a distinction would allow us to  study more explicitly in
our set-up the introduction and diffusion of the computer, which plays a important role in the
wage inequality debate. Moreover, since appropriability is likely to be higher for incremental
change than for major inventions, the extension could directly interact with the central
mechanism in our approach. [31]
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1. The steady rise in the relative employment of non- production employment as well as in
R&D intensity, documented in Table 1, is consistent with this viewpoint (see, for example,
Berman et al. (1994), Machin and Van Reenen (1998), and Adams (1999)). 
2. Also focussing on the erosion of human capital, Gould, Moav and Weinberg (2001)
explain how acceleration of technological progress increases the relative risk of not becoming
educated and hence within-group and between-groups inequality.
3. A similar induced-innovation mechanism is found in Kiley’s (1999) deterministic version
of Acemoglu’s analysis. 
4. We allow for decreasing returns to unskilled labour (0 < * < 1). The underlying assumption
is that the firm also employs a fixed factor whose size is normalized to one.
5. This captures Jones’ (1995) “stepping on toes effect”, indicating congestion and[32]
duplication in research.
6. For a discussion on the firm-specific nature of knowledge, see Smulders and Van de
Klundert (1995) and Peretto (1999). For an explicit treatment of the tacitness of knowledge,
see Dosi (1988).
7. Jovanovic (1997) argues that adjustment and implementation costs of ideas dominate the
non-rivalness of knowledge.
8. If more unskilled labour is employed (L increases), the return to investment is higher, and
hence the skill premium. This is due to the fact that more production workers benefit from the
same increase in productivity due to the non-rivalness of knowledge.
9. Diminishing returns with respect to knowledge in production ($) mitigate this effect, as
growth in the knowledge stock translates to lower growth in consumption if $ is small.
10. Results are available upon request.
11. See Keely and Quah (1998), page 3, second italics added.
12. The Hamiltonian for the producer’s maximization problem now reads 
, where the final term captures 
patents: qn is the costate variable associated to the patent stock and   is the amount of[33]
patents purchased. Equation (19) follows from the optimality conditions with respect to In and
n.
13. Though not apparent from Table 1, in the late 1980s the number of patents per R&D
dollar increased again. It is, however, still unclear how important the numerous institutional
changes with respect to the patent system are in explaining this (see Jaffe, 1999). According
to Kortum and Lerner (1998), this upsurge in patenting (even per R&D dollar) is associated
with an increase in research productivity. The increase could be mimicked  in the model by
increasing the exogenous research productivity in the patent sector.[34]
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Table 1  Non-production wage-bill and employment share, relative wage and R&D
intensity and productivity in the US, 1973-1989.
a
1973 1977 1981 1989
Non-production wage-bill share 0.337 0.351 0.397 0.414
Non-production employment share 0.246 0.261 0.285 0.303
Non-production/production wage differential 1.55 1.53 1.53 1.62
Relative supply of higher education
bc 0.35 0.41 0.46 0.60
R&D intensity manufacturing 0.063 0.062 0.077 0.100
Patents per million $ R&D
d 1.7 1.5 1.1 1.0
a Source: Machin and Van Reenen (1998).
b Source: Acemoglu (2000)
c weeks worked by college equivalents divided by weeks worked of noncollege
equivalents. 
d Source: Kortum (1993).[38]
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Appendices
A. Appropriability: derivation of equation (19).
To account for spillovers to patent firms, we modify the expression for appropriability in
production firms, equation (6), into:
where  is the knowledge base in patent research and  =   is the
value of a marginal increase in this knowledge base. The third term in the denominator of 
(A.1) captures the spillovers from firm i’s research to patent-producing firms. Eliminating the
shadow prices using (8) and (17), evaluating the partial derivatives, imposing symmetry and
assuming 8 = N = 1, we find: 
which is increasing in ". Note that this is appropriability of individual production firms. To
measure economy-wide appropriability we need to account for the spillovers generated by
specialised patent-producing firms (of which they cannot appropriate any of the intertemporal
returns). Since the spillovers of patent-producing firms enter the production function of
patents with (1!:) and the firm-specific knowledge production function with <, economy-





where the numerator represents total appropriated returns (by production firms) and the
denominator represents total intertemporal spillovers. The last two terms in the denominator
denote the spillovers of patent firms to firm-specific knowledge producers and patent
producers respectively. Integration gives economy-wide appropriability, equation (19) in the
main text.
B. Equation (11)
This appendix derives equation (11). Use (5) to rewrite (8) as:
Similarly, use (4) to write (7) as
Devide both sides of equation (9) by q and use (4) and (5) to get
Note from (4), (B.2) and (1) that   and use the Keynes-Ramsey
rule (3) to substitute for r an expression in   and  . Use (B.1) to substitute out q and
(B.2) to substitute out the price. Log differentiation of (B.1) gives an expression for   in
terms of   and  . Substituting this and rearranging gives equation (11) in the main text.
C. Non-scale growth
Here we assume N < 1, l > 0. The main difference with the main text is that here long-run
growth becomes independent of the size of the skilled labour force (Jones, 1995). Hence,
there is no scale-effect on the growth rate from an increase in the supply of skills.
The growth rate depends on the growth of the supply of skilled labour and on the
stock of firms-specific knowledge accumulated in the past, see equation (12). Accordingly,
the growth rate is a predetermined variable that changes over time. Differentiating (12) with




Hence the GG locus for constant growth rate reads 
The SS-locus is the same as in the case of endogenous growth (except for the fact that hl
takes a different value because of population growth) and follows directly from (11). The
Figure below depicts the phase diagram that results from equations (11) and (C.1).
Transitional dynamics occur along the upward-sloping saddle path.
To analyse the consequences of an increase in the supply of skilled labour, we now
need to distinguish between long-run and short-run effects. For simplicity, we consider a
permanent positive shock to H at t = 0, but assume H to grow at rate l at all other dates. The
long-run growth rate is not affected by the supply shock (GG-locus remains unchanged),
while the SS-curve shifts down. Hence in the long run, the skill premium unambiguously
declines in response to an increased supply of skilled labour. In the short run, the growth rate
increases by the expansion of non-production jobs. The combination of the shift of the SS
locus and the short-run increase of the growth rate produces a (short-run) result that is very
similar to that in the endogenous growth case analysed in the main text. Indeed, the skill
premium may increase in the short run. 
To derive an exact condition for the upward-sloping demand curve to arise, we
linearize equations (11) and (C.1) around the steady state and calculate the short-run response
of the skill premium to a change in the supply of skilled labour. The linearized system reads:
where tildes refer to percentage deviations from the initial steady state (log-linearized
variables) and d / g [$(D!1) + (1!")N]. From (12) we find the initial change (a time t = 0)
in the growth rate (which is predetermined):[4]
(C.5)
(C.6)
where   is the permanent shock to the skill endowment.
The stable root of this system is 8l = (1!N)g. Hence, we can calculate the jump in the
skill premium as:
The skill premium increases in the short run if the expression in parenthesis is negative.
Taking into account the definition of d given above, we find the following condition:
Note that this is nearly the same condition as for the endogenous growth case, see (14),
although now of course N is mitigating the effect of " (and h takes a different value because
of population growth). Hence, the very same mechanisms as already explained in the main
text apply. The intuition behind this similarity is also provided in the main text.[5]
 The skill premium with firm-specific and semi-endogenous growth